($k$,$\epsilon$)-Anonymity: $k$-Anonymity with $\epsilon$-Differential
  Privacy by Holohan, Naoise et al.
(k,)-Anonymity:
k-Anonymity with -Differential Privacy
Naoise Holohan, Spiros Antonatos, Stefano Braghin, and Po´l Mac Aonghusa
IBM Research – Ireland
Dublin, Ireland
naoise.holohan@ibm.com
{santonat, stefanob, aonghusa}@ie.ibm.com
Abstract—The explosion in volume and variety of data offers
enormous potential for research and commercial use. Increased
availability of personal data is of particular interest in enabling
highly customised services tuned to individual needs. Preserving
the privacy of individuals against reidentification attacks in this
fast-moving ecosystem poses significant challenges for a one-size
fits all approach to anonymisation.
In this paper we present (k,)-anonymisation, an approach that
combines the k-anonymisation and -differential privacy models
into a single coherent framework, providing privacy guarantees
at least as strong as those offered by the individual models.
Linking risks of less than 5% are observed in experimental
results, even with modest values of k and .
Our approach is shown to address well-known limitations of
k-anonymity and -differential privacy and is validated in an
extensive experimental campaign using openly available datasets.
Index Terms—Differential privacy, k-anonymity, data privacy,
indistinguishability
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s data-driven world, protecting the privacy of
individuals’ information is of the utmost importance to data
curators, both as an ethical consideration and as a legal
requirement. The data collected by governments and corpo-
rations potentially holds great value for scientific research
and commercial purposes, but to unleash its full potential it
must be possible to share data. Sharing or publishing data
while simultaneously preserving user privacy has attracted the
attention of researchers in the computer science, mathematics
and legal fields for decades [1].
Data anonymisation is a popular means by which to achieve
privacy-preservation in datasets for publication. Diverse ap-
proaches have evolved to deal with this challenge. In particu-
lar, k-anonymisation and -differential privacy are of practical
interest and in general use. The k-anonymity framework
anonymises data by generalising quasi identifiers, ensuring that
an individuals’ data is indistinguishable from at least (k − 1)
others’ [2]. Differential privacy also preserves privacy by ren-
dering individuals’ information indistinguishable [12]. How-
ever, instead of using k-anonymity’s deterministic approach
to indistinguishability, differential privacy invokes stochastic
indistinguishability by adding noise or perturbing values.
Both k-anonymity and -differential privacy suffer from a
number of drawbacks. In particular, the curse of dimensionality
of adding extra quasi identifiers to the k-anonymity framework
results in greater information loss [3]. On the other hand,
differential privacy has long been criticised for the large
information loss imposed on records [4]. We show how to
overcome these drawbacks by combining k-anonymity and
-differential privacy, while simultaneously benefitting from
their advantages.
In this paper we present the (k,)-anonymity frame-
work which augments the deterministic indistinguishability
of k-anonymity with the stochastic indistinguishability of -
differential privacy to produce anonymous datasets. The curse
of dimensionality of k-anonymity is addressed by invoking
k-anonymity only on some quasi identifiers, and imposing -
differential privacy on remaining quasis. Additionally, we deal
with the information loss drawback of differential privacy by
leveraging the clusters produced by k-anonymity, consequently
reducing the noise we are required to add to data.
While both techniques have limitations that can be improved
upon in their combination, careful attention must be given
to ensure those limitations are not exacerbated further. In
evaluating such a concern, we examine the risk of our approach
and establish a metric of record linkage. Alongside calculating
the model’s information loss, we can then form an extensive
picture of the model’s effectiveness.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section II
we outline previous work related to the present paper and
also detail the background of k-anonymity and -differential
privacy. In Section III we describe the motivating factors
in developing the (k,)-anonymity framework, and give a
description of the framework in Section IV. The various
means by which we evaluate (k,)-anonymity is given in
Section V. Section VI gives details on the experimental set-up
of this paper, and experimental results follow in Section VII.
Concluding remarks are given in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Related Work
Since Sweeney et. al. [2] proposed the k-anonymity model,
numerous extensions to that model have been proposed to ad-
dress its weaknesses. As an example, [6] proposes `-diversity
and [6] proposes t-closeness, both of which protect against
inference-based attacks. None of the proposed models consider
the combination of other anonymisation protocols.
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Zakerzadeh et. al. [20] propose to tackle the challenges of
high-dimensional privacy by leveraging inter-attribute correla-
tions. Their approach applies to the k-anonymity, `-diversity,
and t-closeness models. Our work applies to all datasets, even
in the absence of attribute correlations.
In [21] the authors propose a way to achieve differential
privacy and k-anonymity on the same data release. In order
to add a stochastic element to k-anonymity (a deterministic
system), the authors propose taking a sample at random from
the original dataset and then processing this sample to achieve
k-anonymity prior to publication. The uncertainty introduced
by randomly selecting users to be present in the released (but
anonymised) dataset ensures differential privacy can also be
achieved.
In contrast, [22] addresses the issue of one-time publishing
of non-overlapping counts with -differential privacy by defin-
ing GS, a method that pre-processes the counts by grouping
and smoothing them via averaging, and then treating the counts
with a differential privacy algorithm.
In [23] the authors present a comparison between the
privacy guarantees provided by applying k-anonymity and -
differential privacy. Also, the authors provide a mechanism to
approximate the equivalent  parameter of a t-closeness setting
and vice-versa.
Recently, Apple has implemented differential privacy to
privately collect data from its users [24]. Analysis of its
algorithms have found that Apple uses  values of 6 and 10,
and values even as high as 43 in testing [25].
B. Notation
We attempt to make use of standard mathematical notation
throughout the paper. Scalars are written in regular font (i.e.
v ∈ R) and vectors are written in boldface (i.e. d ∈ Rn). Given
an integer m ∈ Z, we let [m] = [1,m]∩Z. We let (Ω,P,F) be
a probability space. Given a random variable X : Ω→ R, we
write X(ω)n ∈ Rn as shorthand notation for an n-dimensional
vector of independent samples of X .
C. k-Anonymity
Usually applied to the release of tabular data consisting of
records (rows) and attributes (columns), k-anonymity seeks
to inhibit the linking of the dataset with external, publicly-
available, non-sensitive datasets. Under k-anonymity, each
attribute is uniquely labelled as either (i) an explicit identifier,
(ii) a quasi identifier, or (iii) a sensitive attribute. Explicit
identifiers, those which uniquely identify the record as an
individual (e.g. name, social security number, address, tele-
phone number, email address, etc.) are removed or masked to
prevent reidentification. Sensitive attributes generally represent
the valuable asset of the data, and are usually preserved as is,
however, they do pose a risk through inference attacks, and
can also serve other purposes for the data curator, such as risk/
utility based exploration analysis.
In order to prevent linkage attacks with external data, k-
anonymity requires the combination of all quasi identifiers of
an individual to be indistinguishable from the quasi identifiers
of at least (k − 1) other individuals. This indistinguishability
is achieved by reducing the specificity of the quasi identi-
fiers, commonly referred to as generalisation. This operation
partitions the data into equivalence classes of identical (gen-
eralised) quasi identifiers, each consisting of at least k indi-
viduals. In cases where k-anonymisation cannot be achieved
without significant generalisation, suppression of records can
be enforced to preserve data utility.
Attempts have been made in the past to correct flaws in the
k-anonymity framework [5], [6], but a number of fundamental
drawbacks remain. Firstly, many algorithms for achieving k-
anonymous datasets are designed to cope best with either cat-
egorical or numerical attributes. For example, Optimal Lattice
Optimisation (OLA) [7] uses a pre-defined hierarchy of each
attribute to arrive at the optimal generalisation; examples of
such hierarchies are given in Table I. This is primarily geared
towards categorical attributes, although other work has exam-
ined generalisation hierarchies for numerical attributes [8]. In
contrast, Mondrian [9] performs on-the-fly bisections on the
entire attribute state space to optimally split the dataset into
equivalence classes of size at least k. This approach works best
with numerical attributes, but its application to categorical data
has previously been considered [10].
TABLE I: Examples of Generalisation Hierarchies (* denotes
omitted details)
Attribute # Levels Description
Year of Birth 5 Value, 2-yr interval, 4-yr interval, 8-yr interval, *
Gender 2 Value, Person
Race 2 Value, *
Marital Status 3 Value, Alone/In marriage, *
ZIP code 6 Value, XXXX*, XXX**, XX***, X****, *****
Additionally, k-anonymisation has traditionally only been
used with deterministic tools, meaning the output of the
algorithm will always be identical. This means an attacker
will also know for certain where a particular user lies in the
anonymised dataset, if the attacker knows the user is present
in the dataset. The lack of any uncertainty in the output of
the dataset strengthens the hand of an attacker. By blending k-
anonymisation with differential privacy, we can add an element
of non-determinism.
D. -Differential Privacy
At the same time as k-anonymity was being developed,
other researchers were independently inventing a new way
to achieve privacy-preserving data releases. Instead of con-
sidering privacy as a function of the dataset, the researchers
proposed that privacy should be a function of the mechanism.
Therefore, any dataset which the mechanism processes would
be guaranteed the same level of privacy as any other dataset,
no matter how extreme or sensitive the dataset was.
The idea of stochastic indistinguishability for data privacy
was proposed in [11], and eventually culminated in the for-
mal proposal of differential privacy by Cynthia Dwork [12].
When applied in the context of privacy-preserving data mining
(PPDM), as envisaged by Dwork, differential privacy enforces
that query answers from similar datasets be statistically indis-
tinguishable, as determined by the privacy parameter . This
statistical indistinguishability ensures that the differential in
information gain between two similar datasets is capped, hence
giving rise to the name differential privacy.
1) Model Considerations: Although it was initially envis-
aged for PPDM, differential privacy can also be applied to
privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) applications. In
this scenario, a data curator/owner publishes a dataset which
conforms to differential privacy, with which researchers and
other interest parties can then analyse and/or ask queries.
The guarantees provided by differential privacy ensure that
all subsequent queries asked will also satisfy differential
privacy [13, Theorem 4]. This also allows for the asking of an
unlimited number of queries while still satisfying differential
privacy, a situation which is not trivial to achieve in PPDM.
One instantiation of PPDP is that of randomised response
(RR) [14]. Under randomised response, the privacy-preserving
action is performed before the data is collected by the curator
(e.g. a respondent using a coin-flip to decide whether to answer
a survey question truthfully or not). Randomised response
is actively used when conducting surveys of a sensitive na-
ture [15], [16], as the privacy of the respondents is protected
even from the surveyors. Randomised response can also be
applied to datasets before publication.
In this context, randomised response corresponds to any
PPDP protocol which is independently applied to each row
of a dataset. We can therefore achieve statistical indistin-
guishability between individual records in a dataset, thereby
protecting the privacy of the individuals involved. This is
similar to the approach taken by k-anonymity, where deter-
ministic indistinguishability is used to protect the privacy of
individuals. However, while the approach to protect privacy by
indistinguishability is shared with k-anonymity, using differen-
tial privacy to achieve statistical indistinguishability provides
strong guarantees against adversary attacks [17]. Satisfying
differential privacy in randomised response mechanisms has
been studied in the past for simple mechanisms [18]
2) Definition & Parameters: Before defining differential
privacy, we first present the following objects: a record-
space D (where individual records belong), a dataset size
n ∈ N, a query output space EQ (which may be numerical,
categorical, higher-dimensional, etc.) and a probability space
(Ω,F ,P). In defining differential privacy, we represent a query
Q : Dn → EQ operating on a database d ∈ Dn as a
random variable XQ,d : Ω→ EQ, which we call the response
mechanism. Then, taking a privacy parameter  ≥ 0, the
response mechanism XQ,d satisfies -differential privacy if
P(XQ,d ∈ A) ≤ eP(XQ,d′ ∈ A), (1)
where the datasets d and d′ differ in exactly one record (i.e.
one individual), and where A ⊆ EQ is measurable.
The concept of relaxed differential privacy was later pro-
posed by [17] to relax the strict condition of differential
privacy. Given a relaxation parameter δ ∈ [0, 1], a mechanism
XQ,d is said to satisfy (,δ)-differential privacy if
P(XQ,d ∈ A) ≤ eP(XQ,d′ ∈ A) + δ, (2)
where the datasets d and d′ differ in exactly one record
(i.e. one individual), and where A ⊆ EQ is measurable.
For simplicity, only -differential privacy is considered in this
paper, but we note that all the results and methods can be
applied to relaxed differential privacy simply by ensuring that
the differential privacy mechanism satisfies (2).
It can be seen that the definition of differential privacy is
independent of the type and distribution of the data being
considered. This follows the underlying principle of requiring
privacy to be a function of the mechanism and not the
data. Under differential privacy, two datasets can meet the
same privacy guarantee (i.e. -differential privacy or (,δ)-
differential privacy) independently of whom the data concerns.
3) Response Mechanisms: The data-independence of the
differential privacy model becomes apparent when considering
its application to specific data types. In this paper we focus
on the application of differential privacy to a single column
of numeric data, and the study of this application is well-
developed in the literature. The Laplace mechanism is one
popular such mechanism [12], [19], having first been proposed
by Dwork.
We denote by Lap(µ, b) the Laplace distribution with mean
µ and variance 2b2, whose PDF fLap(µ,b) : R→ R≥0 is given
by
fLap(µ,b)(x) =
1
2b
e−
|x−µ|
b .
The diameter diam : Rn → R≥0 of a dataset d is given by
its range of values, i.e.
diam(d) = max
i
(di)−min
i
(di). (3)
Then, for d ∈ Rn and a random variable Y ∼
Lap
(
0, diam(d)
)
, it is shown in [19] that the response mech-
anism Xd : Ω→ Rn given by
Xd(ω) = d + Y (ω)
n
satisfies -differential privacy.
Although the definition of differential privacy is independent
of the data, we note that the definition of the response
mechanism does depend on the data, by virtue of the presence
of diam(d). In effect, the larger the range of data in the
dataset, the more noise must be added to preserve privacy
(to make individuals indistinguishable). It is also worth noting
that a dataset without any variation (i.e. diam(d) = 0) requires
no noise addition, as individuals in such a dataset are already
indistinguishable.
III. MOTIVATION
Traditionally, when it comes to privacy-preserving data
publishing, data owners employ a variety of techniques and
algorithms to achieve an anonymous result. Data masking tech-
niques are invoked to remove the obvious explicit identifiers,
like names, addresses, phone numbers etc. In order to achieve
stronger privacy guarantees, anonymisation algorithms are
used to protect the quasi identifiers; non-explicit identifiers that
can be used in combination to uniquely identify individuals.
Widely used approaches include performing k-anonymity on
a set of quasi identifiers or applying -differential privacy to
the entire dataset.
Our work has been motivated by the following use case.
Medical data sharing often involves dataset that includes
both categorical and numerical attributes. For example, a
medical dataset might contain demographic information, such
as gender and age, disease information, like diagnosis codes,
and measurements (for example height, weight and blood
readings). In the majority of cases, data owners select a
single anonymisation algorithm to apply. By applying a single
anonymisation approach, the final result might suffer from
high information loss due to the very nature of the applied
algorithms. For example, applying k-anonymity on a high-
dimensional dataset results in large information loss, even for
small values of k. The main driving force of our work is
that the combination of approaches yields better results than
applying a single algorithm.
The (k,)-anonymity approach proposed in this paper first
performs k-anonymisation on a subset of the quasi identi-
fiers and then -differential privacy on the remaining quasi
identifiers with different settings for each equivalence class of
the k-anonymous dataset. In this section we describe how our
approach compares with existing widely-used approaches and
demonstrate why (k,)-anonymity has obvious benefits over
applying single, isolated approaches.
A. The Curse of Dimensionality for k-anonymity
The addition of quasi identifiers to the k-anonymity model
results in greater generalisation and information loss on those
quasi identifiers. If we seek to reduce information loss on any
particular quasi identifiers, we must reduce the k-value which
results in a corresponding increase in reidentification risk, or
remove some quasi identifiers from the data completely. This
poses a problem with data that contains many quasi identifiers
that are valuable to the data for analytical purposes. This
phenomenon has previously been studied in [3].
We denote as information loss the quantification of the
distortion imposed on data as part of the anonymisation
procedure. Calculating information loss on an anonymised
dataset is of the utmost importance, not least in being able to
select the optimal solution. Selecting which information loss
metric to use depends on a host of factors, including the type
of data involved, the algorithm used to achieve privacy and
the possible end-use of the data.
For k-anonymity, when considering information loss on
generalised attributes, we consider two metrics.
1) For attributes generalised according to a hierarchy, we
consider categorical precision. Given a hierarchy with
h levels, a value which is generalised to a level l
(where l = 0 denotes no generalisation and l = h − 1
denotes full generalisation) has information loss of lh−1
according to categorical precision. For example, given
ZIP code as an attribute (h = 6 according to Table I),
a generalised value of 237** has information loss of
2
5 = 0.4 according to categorical precision.
2) For numerical attributes generalised without a hierarchy,
we consider numerical precision. The information loss
of such an attribute is given as the ratio of the range
of the generalised interval to the range of the dataset.
For example, given a dataset with height in the range
[150, 190] and a generalised value of [165 − 180], the
information loss according to numerical precision is
180−165
190−150 =
15
40 = 0.375.
This curse of dimensionality is illustrated in Figure 1. We
applied both OLA and Mondrian k-anonymity algorithms on
three real datasets that were augmented to include height
and weight attributes (more details of the datasets and their
properties used in this example are given in Section VI).
The information loss on each dataset’s quasi identifiers is
shown before and after the addition of an extra quasi identifier
(namely a height attribute for the Adult and Florida datasets,
and a weight attribute for the Michigan dataset). Information
loss on height/weight is measured by categorical precision in
OLA, and numerical precision in Mondrian.
We observe that in the case of OLA, adding the height
as a quasi identifier the impact on the information loss is
significant. We can spot two major patterns. The first one is
that for small k values adding height as a quasi leads to much
higher information loss of the original quasis. For example, in
the Adult dataset for k equal to 20, the information loss was
doubled to 0.8 up from 0.4. The second is that for larger values
of k (more than 20), the information loss for the original quasis
remains the same but the loss for the height attribute is more
than 0.8. We therefore have the quasi identifiers experiencing
additional generalisation at the expense of adding an extra
quasi, which itself has been excessively generalised in order
to be included. In practical terms, the height attribute was
transformed close to its maximum generalisation level. For the
case of Mondrian, we observe that our approach results to a
relative 4-10% decrease on the information loss of the original
quasis while presenting the same or less relative average error
on the height/weight attributes.
B. Global Differential Privacy versus (k,)-Anonymity
The diversity of the data being processed by a differential
privacy response mechanism has an impact on the level of
noise added, with greater diversity requiring greater perturba-
tion. In numerical attributes, the diversity is measured as the
diameter of the data.
By first applying k-anonymity, we can take advantage of the
partitioning into equivalence classes for applying differential
privacy. If we consider the addition of an extra quasi identifier
to a k-anonymous dataset, the noise addition can be reduced
by considering each equivalence class to be a separate dataset.
We then reduce the quantity of noise required to achieve -
differential privacy, while maintaining the indistinguishability
guarantee of differential privacy.
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Formally, let’s consider the case of adding Laplace-
distributed noise to achieve differential privacy (see Sec-
tion II-D3). The magnitude (as determined by the scale factor)
of the Laplace noise required to achieve -differential privacy
is given as diam . Given a dataset d ∈ Rn, and an equivalence
class of size m as a subset of that dataset ec ∈ Rm, where,
for each i ∈ [m], there exists a unique and distinct j ∈ [n]
such that eci = dj , we note that
diam(d) ≥ diam(ec),
since min(ec) ≥ min(d) and max(ec) ≤ max(d). Hence the
variance Var of the noise being added satisfies
Var
(
Lap
(
0,
diam(d)

))
= 2
(
diam(d)

)2
≥ Var
(
Lap
(
0,
diam(ec)

))
.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative relative error distribution of
applying differential privacy to the entire dataset alongside
that of applying differential privacy on equivalence classes.
We observe that the relative error when applying differential
privacy to the entire dataset is consistently larger than our
approach.
C. Uniform Additive Perturbation versus (k,)-Anonymity
It is common to use uniform noise in additive perturbation
mechanisms for data privacy purposes [26], [1]. While it is
possible to obscure a value by using uniform noise, it is not
guaranteed that such a technique will ensure indistinguishabil-
ity between values. Due to the finite support of the uniform
distribution, there will be output values possible which will
map directly back to its original.
For example, using additive perturbation with ±10% uni-
formly distributed noise, it is not possible to guarantee the
indistinguishability of the values 1 and 2, as 1 will be perturbed
somewhere in the range [0.9, 1.1], and 2 will be perturbed in
[1.8, 2.2]. Similarly, with noise of ±100%, the value 2 will be
distinguishable from 1 if a positive perturbation is applied.
The privacy guarantees provided by our approach far out-
weigh those provided by uniform perturbation. Nevertheless,
we can easily match the information loss of a differential
privacy mechanism with the same information loss incurred by
a uniform perturbation. Figure 2 shows the cumulative relative
error distribution of a uniform perturbation (±5%, dotted line)
alongside that of a differential privacy mechanism with the
same mean error (solid line). Similarly, given the mean error
from the differential privacy mechanism, we can represent it
in the form of the error of a uniform perturbation mechanism
for ease of understanding. Information loss and error is further
discussed in Section V-A.
IV. (k,)-ANONYMITY
We now detail the formulation of the (k,)-anonymity
privacy framework. An outline of this workflow is given in
Algorithm 1.
As a first step, we classify the attributes into explicit
identifiers, quasi identifiers and sensitive attributes. We then
further partition the quasi identifiers into k-quasis, upon which
we apply traditional k-anonymity, and -quasis upon which we
apply -differential privacy. The selection of the k-quasis and
the -quasis can be done based on the use case of the data, the
clustering algorithm being used for k-anonymity, or any other
reason deemed appropriate by the data curator. An example
of attribute classification is detailed in Table II. We selected
the numerical attributes as -quasis inkeeping with the focus
of this paper.
TABLE II: Attribute classification example
Attributes: Name, SSN, Gender, Year of Birth, ZIP code,
Marital status, Height, Weight
Explicit Identifiers: Name, SSN
Sensitive attributes: Blood pressure
Quasi identifiers: Gender, Year of Birth, ZIP code, Marital Status,
Height, Weight
k-Quasis: Gender, Year of Birth, ZIP code, Marital Status
-Quasis: Height, Weight
The k-quasis are then processed to satisfy k-anonymity,
thereby clustering the dataset into equivalence classes of at
least k records. Certain k-anonymisation algorithms, including
OLA, support suppression of records in order to reduce the
generalisation required to achieve k-anoymity.
The next step is to apply differential privacy to the -
quasis. We only take inspiration from the general concept of
differential privacy and its notion of stochastic indistinguisha-
bility, rather than applying differential privacy in its original
formulation. While differential privacy originally sought to
make an individual in a dataset indistinguishable from any
other individual who could possibly be in the dataset, our
approach is intricately linked to our threat model.
As k-anonymisation has already taken place, an attacker
can therefore always uniquely identify the equivalence class
to which an individual belongs by examining the k-quasis. We
must therefore ensure reidentification cannot occur using the
-quasis.
By making the -quasis stochastically indistinguishable, we
can prevent against such reidentification attacks. However,
as an attacker knows which equivalence class to which an
individual belongs, we need only make the -quasis indistin-
guishable within each equivalence class. -Quasis need not be
indistinguishable between separate equivalence classes, since
our attack model ensures there will never be a reidentification
risk between equivalence classes.
In a differential privacy context, we can therefore treat each
equivalence class as an independent population of individuals.
For example, for a ‘height’ -quasi and an equivalence class
with a maximum ‘height’ of 170cm, we need not make this -
quasi in this equivalence class indistinguishable with a ‘height’
value of 180cm, since it doesn’t occur in the equivalence
class population. By reducing the range of values of the
population, we reduce the magnitude of noise required to
achieve differential privacy, thereby reducing the distortion
imposed on the data.
In the application of differential privacy, it is important that
an equivalence class is considered a collection of records,
not an independent collection of attributes. If each -quasi is
Algorithm 1: The (k,)-Anonymity Workflow
Input: Dataset D
Output: (k,)-anonymous dataset D′
1 Perform attribute classification;
2 kQID = k-quasis;
3 eQID = -quasis;
4 Remove explicit identifiers;
5 Perform k-anonymisation on kQID;
6 foreach Equivalence class ec of the k-anonymous dataset
do
7 Apply -differential privacy mechanism to eQID to
the record of ec;
8 Merge the -differentially private and k-anonymous
equivalence classes;
9 Merge the -differentially private and k-anonymous
equivalence classes;
10 Shuffle records;
processed independently, correlation between attributes will
result in additional privacy leakage. This leakage can be
demonstrated by copying the same -quasi multiple times in a
dataset. If differential privacy is applied independently to each
of the copies, an adversary can average the perturbed copies
to obtain an unbiased estimate of the original value. Such an
attack would not be possible if differential privacy was instead
applied to each record.
Finally, we shuffle the records to prevent against order-based
attacks.
V. MODEL EVALUATION
In this section we detail the methods and metrics by which
we evaluate the (k,)-anonymity model. Since we introduce
a new anonymity model, we need to provide the framework
to measure both information loss and re-identification risk.
We present the threat model under which we consider risk as
well as our approach to alleviate the risk introduced by the
stochastic indistinguishability of -differential privacy.
A. Information Loss
In this paper we only consider numerical attributes as -
quasis and for these, we consider the average relative error as
a measure of information loss. As we are dealing with random
variables, we consider the expected error that will result on a
value from applying the mechanism. We can then calculate
the total error on the dataset as the average of errors on each
value.
In general, the relative error of an anonymised value v′,
given an original value of v ∈ R is given by
err(v′) =
∣∣∣∣v′ − vv
∣∣∣∣ .
Formally, given a value v ∈ R, and a noise random variable
Z,diam : Ω→ R, we calculate the error err : R→ R≥0 by
err(v + Z,diam(ω)) = E
[∣∣∣∣Z,diam(ω)v
∣∣∣∣] (4)
=
E [|Z,diam(ω)|]
|v| (5)
For a set of n values, d ∈ Rn (i.e. the -quasi column of the
dataset), the total error err : Rn → R≥0 is given by
err (d + Z,diam(ω)
n) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
err (di + Z,diam(ω)) .
As we apply the differential privacy mechanism to each
equivalence class independently, we calculate the error per
equivalence class. Given an equivalence class of size m,
denoted by ec ∈ Rm, we can calculate its information loss
as a function of its harmonic mean.
The harmonic mean H of ec is given by
H(ec) =
m∑m
i=1
1
eci
,
which allows us to calculate the information loss as follows:
err(ec + (Z,diam(ec))
m) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
E[|Z,diam(ec)|]
|eci|
= E[|Z,diam(ec)|] 1
m
m∑
i=1
1
|eci|
= E[|Z,diam(ec)|] 1
H(ec)
(6)
We can further simplify (6) in the case where the noise we
add is drawn from a Laplace distribution. As noted in Sec-
tion II-D3, the addition of Laplace-distributed noise with mean
zero and variance 2b2 (where b = diam ) satisfies -differential
privacy. We therefore have Z,diam ∼ Lap
(
0, diam
)
, giving
E[|Z,diam|] = E
[∣∣∣∣Lap(0, diam
)∣∣∣∣]
= E
[
Exp
( 
diam
)]
=
diam

,
where Exp(λ) denotes the negative exponential distribution
with mean 1λ , whose PDF fExp(λ) : R≥0 → R is given by
fExp(λ)(x) = λe
−λx.
It can be shown for a random variable X ∼ Lap(µ, b), that
|X − µ| ∼ Exp ( 1b ).
We therefore have the information loss for an equivalence
class ec:
err(ec + (Z,diam(ec))
m) =
diam(ec)
H(ec)
. (7)
To calculate the information loss for an entire dataset, we
average over the weighted sums of the equivalence classes:
err(d + (Z,diam)
m) =
1

∑
ec
diam(ec)
H(ec)
|ec|
n
, (8)
where |ec| ∈ N denotes the number of records in ec.
Using (8), the error of a dataset can be determined before
applying differential privacy. Depending on the use case, this
error calculation can be used in the determination of an -value
to preserve the utility of the data as required.
B. Linking Risk
Before proceeding with the formulation of the linking risk,
it is important to describe the considered threat model under
which our model operates. We adopt a worse-case threat model
for the purpose of this paper. We are seeking to prevent reiden-
tification attacks by an attacker with access to the (unaltered)
explicit identifiers and quasi identifiers of the dataset. We as-
sume the attacker has no knowledge of the sensitive attribute of
the dataset on any individual. This is a reasonable assumption
to make from a linking attack perspective, since the sensitive
attributes of a dataset frequently represent the value of a
dataset, and hence are new information that was not previously
available. In reidentifying a record of a dataset, an adversary
would attempt to link the quasi identifiers of an individual
from their unanonymised copy with the anonymised dataset.
The challenge is to ensure sufficient indistinguishability in
the anonymised dataset (using a combination of deterministic
and stochastic indistinguishability) to prevent reidentification,
while also preserving the utility of the dataset.
For analysing the risk of a (k,)-anonymous dataset,
we present the following simple, nearest-neighbour, linking
model. Given a (k,)-anonymous dataset and its equivalence
classes, we seek to link records back to the records of the
original dataset.
For each record in the anonymised dataset, we select a
candidate record in the original dataset which lies in the same
equivalence class as the one being investigated. This candidate
is selected as being the one whose -quasi (in the original
dataset) lies closest to the anonymised -quasi of the record
being investigated. If the investigated record and the candidate
record correspond to the same record, then we say a successful
link has occurred. We repeat this process for every record
in the anonymised dataset, and report the linking risk as the
fraction of records which have been successfully linked in the
manner.
Formally, given an equivalence class ec ∈ Rm, and its
anonymised version ec′ = ec + Lap
(
0, diam(ec)
)n
∈ Rm,
a successful link for record i ∈ [m] has occurred if ec′i is
closer to eci than all other ecj .
We construct an indicator function φec′ : [m] → {0, 1}
which signals a successful link:
φec′(i) =
{
1, if |ec′i − eci| = minj∈[m] |ec′i − ecj |;
0, otherwise.
We then define the number of linkable records, link : Rn →
[0,m] ∩ Z, as follows:
link(ec′) =
∑
i∈[m]
φec′(i).
For an entire anonymised dataset d′ ∈ Rn, we calculate its
linking risk, risk : Rn → [0, 1], as the proportion of records in
the dataset that can be successfully linked back to its original
record:
risk(d′) =
1
n
∑
ec′
link(ec′).
It is important to note that this does not constitute a reiden-
tification risk, as records in the same equivalence class with
the same value for the -quasi will remain indistinguishable.
C. Confidence-based k-Anonymity
Although the implementation of differential privacy makes
individual values stochastically indistinguishable, it is possible
to obtain a measure of deterministic indistinguishability for
an instance of a (k,)-anonymous dataset. First, we compute
a confidence interval around the differentially private value,
based on the known  and diameter of the -quasi of its
equivalence class. This gives a confidence interval around
from where the original value came, thereby allowing an
adversary to link the anonymous record using his/her table
of un-anonymised quasis.
Given an equivalence class ec ∈ Rm, and its anonymised
version ec′ = ec+ Lap
(
0, diam(ec)
)m
, and a confidence c ∈
[0, 1], we seek to determine a linking range rc ∈ R≥0 such
that for each i ∈ [m],
P(eci ∈ [ec′i − rc, ec′i + rc]) = c. (9)
We can simplify (9) based on our assumption of Laplace-
distributed noise as follows, where b = diam(ec) :
P (eci ∈ [ec′i − rc, ec′i + rc]) = P (|Lap(0, b)| ≤ rc)
= P
(
Exp
(
1
b
)
≤ rc
)
=
∫ rc
0
1
b
e−
x
b dx
= −
[
e−
x
b
]rc
0
= 1− e− rcb
= c.
We then solve for rc, and find
rc = −b ln(1− c)
= −diam(ec)

ln(1− c).
After completing the (k,)-anonymity process on a dataset,
we use the above confidence interval calculations to evaluate
the linking vulnerabilities of the anonymised dataset. For each
anonymised equivalence class ec′ ∈ Rm, we analyse each
record ec′i, i ∈ [m] and count the number `i of records in ec
that fall within its c-confidence interval:
`i = |{j : ecj ∈ [eci − rc, eci + rc]}|.
To maintain the risk profile of k-anonymity, we propose
c-confident k-anonymity for -quasis, whereby records with
0 < `i < k are suppressed. We choose not to suppress records
where `i = 0, as these are records which the differential
privacy process has rendered outlying, thereby posing little
reidentification risk. Furthermore, we propose to suppress
entire equivalence classes which are left with fewer than
k records after this process, i.e. equivalence ec ∈ Rm is
suppressed whenever
|ec| − |{i : `i < k}| < k.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In order to validate our model, we used three datasets
for experimental analysis. The three datasets are publicly
available, and in order to increase the granularity of the data,
we added synthetically-created additional attributes. We used
the training set of the UCI Adult dataset [27], and samples
of the publicly-available voter lists from Florida [28] and
Michigan [29] as the base datasets.
For the purpose of this paper, we are limiting the scope of
the -quasis. We limit our analysis to using only one -quasi
in each dataset, and additionally, require that this -quasi is a
numerical attribute.
As the three datasets in question contained no numerical
attribute, we generated a synthetic numerical attribute for
each. This consisted of adding a height column to the Adult
and Florida datasets and a weight column to the Michigan
dataset. In generating the height columns, we generated normal
distributions for age and gender, fitting the data provided
in [30] for the US population. The height for each individual
was generated by independently sampling from the distribution
corresponding to their age and gender. Similarly, in generating
the weight column, we generated log-normal distributions for
age and gender, fitting the data provided in [30] for the US
population. The weight for each individual was generated by
independently sampling from the distribution corresponding to
their age and gender.
Table III lists the datasets and their respective attributes as
used in our experiments. Attributes which were synthetically
created for analytical purposes are listed in italic font.
For each experiment, we first removed all explicit identifiers
from the dataset, as listed in Table III. We then created k-
anonymous versions of the datasets using both the OLA and
Mondrian k-anonymisation algorithms. We ran experiments
for k values of 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100. The generalisation
hierarchy used for each of the k-quasis (all quasi identifiers
except the -quasis height and weight) is listed in Table I.
The maximum suppression applied by the OLA algorithm was
fixed at 5%. Table IV details the suppressions applied by OLA
for the three datasets and for the k values of interest.
For the application of differential privacy, experiments were
run using  values of 0.05, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8 and 16. In some
figures in this paper, for ease of readability, some values of
 are not plotted. In each case, the reported results are based
on an average over 30 runs, given that applying differential
privacy is a stochastic process.
TABLE III: Dataset Attributes (synthetic attributes listed in italic)
Adult Florida Michigan
Number of records: 32 440 134 791 72 825
Direct identifiers: Patient Id, Name, E-mail Name, Surname, Address, E-mail, Phone Number Name, Surname, Address
Quasi identifiers: Year of Birth, Gender, Race, Marital Status, Height ZIP code, Gender, Year of Birth, Race, Height ZIP Code, Gender, Year of Birth, Weight
k-Quasis: Year of Birth, Gender, Race, Marital Status ZIP code, Gender, Year of Birth, Race ZIP Code, Gender, Year of Birth
-Quasis: Height Height Weight
TABLE IV: Effective suppression applied by the OLA algo-
rithm (maximum 5%)
k
Dataset 2 5 10 20 50 100
Adult 1.67% 2.42% 3.71% 1.47% 1.76% 4.80%
Florida 4.77% 3.91% 4.15% 4.18% 3.47% 3.48%
Michigan 4.83% 1.88% 3.73% 3.96% 1.53% 1.34%
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The approach presented in this paper needs to be evaluated
in terms of risk and information loss. We measured the impact
on information loss based on the metric we described in
Section V-A. For risk, we evaluated the nearest-neighbour
linking model (Section V-B) and measured the suppression
rates needed to enforce confidence-based k-anonymity (Sec-
tion V-C). We also evaluated the computational performance
of the model.
We used the (k,)-anonymisation algorithm on all three
datasets: Adult, Florida and Michigan. All datasets were evalu-
ated using the OLA and Mondrian k-anonymisation algorithms
and for various k and  to allow us to examine how the model
behaves for different parameters.
A. Impact on Information Loss
As a first step we tried to understand the relationship
between k and  and the resulting information loss on the
-quasis. We expect that information loss will increase with
decreasing , inkeeping with (8). Additionally, we expect
information loss to increase with k, due to the increased
diameter of the data in larger equivalence classes.
Our results are in line with expectations. Values of  of 8
and 16 consistently produce errors less than 5%.
In Figure 3 the average relative error is plotted against k
for various values of . As expected, we can see decreasing
information loss for our mechanism with decreasing k. This
behaviour is most pronounced for the Mondrian algorithm,
with small values of k benefitting most from Mondrian’s local
recoding strategy.
In Figure 4 the average relative error is plotted against  for
various values of k, swapping the plotting order to Figure 3.
As expected we see a close correlation between error and ,
with errors consistently below 5% for  ≥ 8. The inversely
proportional behaviour corresponds directly to the information
loss model (8), which contains a 1 term independently of k.
We see a number of algorithm-specific discrepancies in
Figure 3 for the OLA algorithm. For the Adult dataset with
OLA, the error is seen to drop for k = 100. This can
be attributed to the increased suppression imposed by OLA
at k = 100 (4.8%, see Table IV) compared to k = 50
(1.76%). With greater OLA suppression, more outlying values
are suppressed, thereby reducing the diameter of equivalence
classes, and hence reducing the noise added by differential
privacy. For the Florida dataset with OLA, the spike at k = 5
can similarly be explained by suppression, albeit by reduced
OLA suppression. With reduced suppression, fewer outliers
are removed, requiring additional noise to be added to the
data to anonymise these values.
Figures 3 and 4 also demonstrate the greater levels of
flexibility afforded to data curators in the tradeoff of privacy
(using ) and information loss (using average relative error).
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Av
er
ag
e 
Re
la
tiv
e 
Er
ro
r
Adult dataset (OLA)
 = 0.5
 = 1
 = 2
 = 4
 = 8
 = 16
Adult dataset (Mondrian)
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Av
er
ag
e 
Re
la
tiv
e 
Er
ro
r
Florida dataset (OLA) Florida dataset (Mondrian)
2 20 40 60 80 100
k
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Av
er
ag
e 
Re
la
tiv
e 
Er
ro
r
Michigan dataset (OLA)
2 20 40 60 80 100
k
Michigan dataset (Mondrian)
Fig. 3: Average relative error for the height/weight attribute
versus k for various datasets, k-anonymisation algorithms and
 values.
B. Risk Evaluation
After analysing the impact of the proposed method on
information loss, we now try to understand the relationship
between selecting k and  and the resulting linking risk on
the dataset. We expect that the linking risk, as presented in
Section V-B, will decrease with decreasing  and decrease with
increasing k. As  dictates the strength of privacy (with larger
 guaranteeing less privacy), the linking risk should increase
as privacy decreases. Similarly with k, the larger the k, the
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Fig. 4: Average relative error for the height/weight attribute
versus  for various datasets, k-anonymisation algorithms and
k values.
greater the privacy guarantee, hence we expect reduced linking
risk when k is increased.
Figure 5 shows the linking risk of (k,)-anonymity, as a
percentage of linkable records, versus  for various values of
k. We can see that linking risk below 5% is attainable for
moderate values of k and  in all the set-ups examined. Across
all datasets, large values of k present linking risk below or
close to 5%, even for larger . For smaller values of k, the
value of  may need to be tuned, but linking risk below 5%
is still attainable.
We note that the linking risk in some cases exceeds the k-
anonymisation risk of 1k . This is due to our use of an additional
quasi identifier in the linking attack, where this quasi has
not be anonymised in line with k-anonymity. The additional
information therefore presents additional information to an
attacker to help re-identify records.
In line with expectations, linking risk decreases when pri-
vacy guarantees are increased. This behaviour is seen across
all three datasets and across both k-anonymisation algorithms.
It should be noted that the Florida and Michigan datasets are
missing data for small k values, in particular 2 and 5. This is
because the linking risk associated with these values of k for
these datasets exceeds 10%, so falls outside the range of the
plot. We decide not to extend the plotting region since we view
linking risks over 10% as excessively risky to be considered
for use.
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Fig. 5: Percentage of linked records versus  for various
datasets, k-anonymisation algorithms and k values.
C. Measuring Confidence-Based k-Anonymity
The last evaluation step is understanding the relationship
between k and  and the suppressions required to achieve
confidence-based k-anonymity. By suppressing risky records,
the original guarantees of k-anonymity can be preserved. We
expect fewer risky records to be found for small , reflecting
the greater privacy guarantees offered by smaller .
For the purpose of these evaluations we tested confidence-
based k-anonymity for confidence values of 70%, 90%, 99%,
99.9%, 99.99% and 99.999%. In Figure 6 we plot the results
for a confidence value of 99%, which we consider to be
a reasonable confidence threshold. The behaviour for other
confidences produces qualitatively similar results, but with
different volumes of suppressions. Greater confidence corre-
sponds to a larger confidence interval, hence imposing fewer
suppressions, while more suppressions are required when the
confidence is reduced.
For small values of , 99%-confident k-anonymity can be
achieved by suppressing fewer than 2% of records. This is
evident across all datasets and is independent of k.
When using OLA, the algorithm imposes suppressions on
the data to achieve k-anonymity. These suppressions are
shown in Figure 6 as a solid grey line, and a user-specified
maximum of 5% has been imposed. Importantly, for small
, 99%-confident k-anonymity is achievable in most cases
without exceeding the suppression budget of 5%, when OLA’s
suppression and confidence-based k-anonymity suppressions
are summed.
When using the Mondrian algorithm, the same behaviour is
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Fig. 6: Percentage of additional suppressions required
to maintain 0.99-pseudo k-anonymity versus k for various
datasets, k-anonymisation algorithms and  values.
observed for small , while larger  values can be used while
still keeping suppression below 5%.
Figure 6 highlights the data-dependence of this model. The
model is particularly sensitive to the distribution of the values
in an equivalence class, and to the size of equivalence classes.
Equivalence classes close in size to k are more likely to
be suppressed entirely. Therefore, an dataset and algorithm
which produces smaller equivalence classes will result in
greater suppression to meet confidence-based k-anonymity.
This behaviour can be seen in the increased suppression rates
for the Mondrian algorithm against OLA.
Nevertheless, achieving less than 5% suppression for vari-
ous  and k values shows the (k,)-anonymity model satisfies
its goal of protecting the privacy of individuals in the data.
D. System performance
We evaluated the system performance of (k,)-anonymity
in terms of running time. We compared the execution time of
both Mondrian and OLA algorithms for the Florida and Michi-
gan datasets when applying k-anonymity with -quasis treated
as k-quasis against the execution time of (k,)-anonymity.
The results for Mondrian and OLA (with suppression
threshold set to 5%) are shown in Figures 7 and 8 respectively.
We observe that in the case of Mondrian, as displayed at Figure
7, the execution time of (k,)-anonymity increases across all
experiments. This is due to the fact that we have to perform
an extra loop over the dataset to apply the -differential
privacy for each equivalence class. On the other hand, for
OLA we notice a significant decrease in the execution time,
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Fig. 7: Running time of k-anonymity versus (k,)-anonymity
when Mondrian is used as the base algorithm
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Fig. 8: Running time of k-anonymity versus (k,)-anonymity
when OLA is used as the base algorithm
ranging from 14x to 32x speedup, as shown in Figure 8.
This performance increase is attributed to the fact that (k,)-
anonymity reduces the dimensionality of quasis that need to
be explored by OLA. When applying (k,)-anonymity the
exploration lattice for OLA is 8 times smaller and the lattice
exploration converges very fast, absorbing the cost of the
extra loop to apply differential privacy. Similar results were
observed for the Adult dataset.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented (k,)-anonymity, a framework
that combines k-anonymity with -differential privacy. This
work lays out the model foundation to combine different
anonymisation protocols and present them in a uniform way in
terms of information loss and risk. Our model was validated
experimentally using real datasets and use cases. The results of
our experiments have shown that the combination of the two
anonymisation protocols is both feasible and has controllable
properties. We demonstrated the impact on the information
loss, where (k,)-anonymity produces better results than k-
anonymity alone due to reduced dimensionality of the quasi
identifiers space. We also presented the linking risk and our
approach on how to achieve confidence-based k-anonymity
under a strong adversarial model. Our results have shown that
even for high confidence levels we only need to suppress a
small percentage of records in order to achieve the desirable
privacy guarantees. We believe that our work provides a fresh
perspective on utilising different anonymisation protocols that,
so far, are exclusively used in isolation.
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